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2Introduction
Copyright is dead.2 The first to pronounce its passing was probably John Perry 
Barlow. In his famous 1993 essay, “The Economy of Ideas,” 3 he defended the theory that 
dematerialization has made copyright, which was designed to protect the bottle and not 
the wine, irrelevant, for in the digital era the bottle has disappeared.4 He then handed 
down his verdict, with no possible appeal:
Intellectual property law cannot be patched, retrofitted, or expanded to contain the 
gasses of digitized expression any more than real estate law might be revised to 
cover the allocation of broadcasting spectrum. (Which, in fact, rather resembles 
what is being attempted here.) We will need to develop an entirely new set of 
methods as befits this entirely new set of circumstances.
In the slipstream of this former rancher and spokesperson for the Grateful Dead,
academics in the United States and in other countries began to explain why copyright had 
become obsolete in the Internet era.5 However, the funeral was perhaps a bit premature. 
2
 Eben Moglen uses a “Star Wars” analogy to make the point: “. . . the obsolescence of the 
IPdroid is neither unforeseeable nor tragic. Indeed it may find itself clanking off into the desert, 
still lucidly explaining to an imaginary room the profitably complicated rules for a world that no 
longer exists.” Anarchism Triumphant: Free Software and the Death of Copyright, in THE 
COMMODIFICATION OF INFORMATION 107, 131 (Niva Elkin-Koren & Neil Weinstock Netanel 
eds., 2002)
3 John Perry Barlow, The Economy of Ideas: A framework for patents and copyrights in the 
Digital Age. (Everything you know about intellectual property is wrong.). WIRED, 2.03, Mar. 
1994, available at: http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/2.03/economy.ideas.html
4
 “Copyright worked well because, Gutenberg notwithstanding, it was hard to make a book. 
Furthermore, books froze their contents into a condition that was as challenging to alter as it was 
to reproduce. [. . .] For all practical purposes, the value was in the conveyance and not the thought 
conveyed.” 
“In other words, the bottle was protected, not the wine. Now, as information enters Cyberspace, 
the native home of Mind, these bottles are vanishing.”
5
 The reader will find a good example in the article by Glynn S. Lunney Jr., The Death of 
Copyright: Digital Technology, Private Copying, and the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 87 
Virginia L. Rev. 813, 815 (2001): “COPYRIGHT is dead. The Digital Millennium Copyright Act 
("DMCA") has killed it. […] With the enactment of the DMCA, there is a very real danger that 
our system of protecting creative works will serve primarily private interests. If so, then the 
protection of creative works will have come full circle […] and copyright, in the sense of 
protection intended primarily to serve the public interest, will surely have died”. See also Robert 
C. Denicola, Mostly Dead? Copyright Law in the New Millennium, 47 J. Copyright Soc’y of the 
3Copyright is still with us, and few can prove that a (capitalist) society6 without something 
like copyright would ensure as well, or better, the creation and distribution of new works.
But certain blows have been dealt. First of all, it must be said that the copyright 
industries (the so-called “rightsholders”) have not been dazzling in their rush to adapt to 
the Internet. These industries have essentially fought the Internet, and the music and 
movie industries are still fighting.7 I was among those who suggested in 1998 that a 
“business model” approach be used.8 The text industry and scientific journals put their 
material on line four or five years ago, and some have considerably broadened the 
choices offered to their readers, whether by making available lab data files (too 
voluminous to print out) or three-dimensional models of molecules, or simply by 
accelerating distribution.9
USA 193, 207 (2000): “Yet how much of the old, legislatively-defined copyright will remain 
relevant in the new Millennium? Copyright law may be mostly dead in the wake of the DMCA, 
but ‘mostly dead is still alive.’ Traditional copyright will no doubt remain as a convenient if 
redundant alternative to breach of contract. Copyright law will also be necessary for works that 
leak out of their containers and are accessible without a contract. We may also need traditional-
looking copyright law to pursue stronger protection abroad.”
6 See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 123 S.Ct. 769, 785 (n. 18) (2003),  “…copyright law celebrates the 
profit motive, recognizing that the incentive to profit from the exploitation of copyrights will 
redound to the public benefit by resulting in the proliferation of knowledge… The profit motive is 
the engine that ensures the progress of science. […] Rewarding authors for their creative labor 
and ‘promot[ing]…. Progress’’ are thus complementary; as James Madison observed, in 
copyright ‘[t]he public good fully coincides… with the claims of individuals.”
7
 We might remember the fight against the photocopier. In a 1961 report of the Register of 
Copyrights in the United States, a similar alarm was being sounded: “. . . Copying has now taken 
on new dimensions with the development of photocopying devices by which any quantity of 
material can be reproduced readily and in multiple copies . . .” REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF 
COPYRIGHTS ON THE GENERAL REVISION OF THE U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW (Jul. 25, 1961).
8
 Daniel Gervais, Electronic Rights Management and Digital Identifier Systems, 4 J. of Elec. 
Publishing (1999), available at http://www.press.umich.edu/jep/04-03: “The content is there. In 
almost all cases, it is in digital form or can be digitized. Networks with sufficient bandwidth are 
being built, and many business users and individual consumers are already connected. They are 
ready for the content. Many copyright industries and other rights holders are coming to the view 
that global networks represent good business opportunities and that digital, though it may be 
different, is nonetheless interesting commercially. In fact, it may be the only future growth area. 
To put it simply, digital is inevitable.” This was a report presented to WIPO (Geneva) in 
December 1998.
9 See Daniel Gervais, Copyright and eCommerce, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE GLOBAL 
MARKETPLACE (Melvin Simensky et al. eds., 2001 Supp., 2002). 
4After some setbacks concerning standardization issues,10 and many sensational 
trials aiming to impede exchanges of files between Web surfers on a central site11 or a 
peer-to-peer network, the recording industry is just starting to authorize downloading of 
music files.12  The movie industry is still testing distribution systems.
The main concern of most industries seems to be to avoid any reuse of the 
downloaded content. And this is precisely where the problem of adaptability of copyright 
to the digital world is most obvious.
This paper argues that it is time to replace the existing set of copyright rights by 
focusing on its true policy objectives. The paper thus begins with a brief look at the 
history of copyright and tries to identify what is wrong with extant norms.  In other 
words, the spotlight will be on the apparent chasm between the policy objectives and the 
norms.  The paper will then suggest that a new international copyright norm could be 
created based on the Berne Convention’s three-step test, in harmony with the US fair use 
doctrine13. 
10
 I am thinking here mainly of the Secure Digital Music Initiative (SDMI), a project that has been 
put on the back burner. On the project’s site at www.sdmi.org is the following (Nov. 2003): “As 
of May 18, 2001 SDMI is on hiatus, and intends to re-assess technological advances at some later 
date.”
11 Including the famous suit against Napster: A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 
(9th Cir. 2001). See Sarah H. McWane, Hollywood vs. Silicon Valley: DeCSS Down, Napster to 
Go?, 9 CommLaw Conspectus 87, 107 (2001): “The recording industry holds stubbornly to the 
retailing model where people are actually purchasing CDs when, in reality, people are now 
downloading MP3s”. See Michael S. Elkin and Alexandra Khlyavich, Napster Near and Far: 
Will the Ninth Circuit’s Ruling Affect Secondary Infringement in the Outer Reaches of 
Cyberspace?, 27 Brooklyn J. Int'l L. 381 (2002) (discussing the findings in and the impact of the 
Napster case).
12 For example, on the iTunes.com site belonging to Apple Computers, became an overnight 
success in spite of the fact that originally it only worked with Macintosh computers using the 
latest version (OS10) of the operating system. See Neill Strauss, Apple Finds a Route For Online 
Music Sales, N.Y. Times, May 29, 2003, at E1. See also Press Release, Apple Computers, One 
Million Copies of iTunes for Windows Software Downloaded in Three and a Half Days (Oct. 20, 
2003), at http://www.apple.com/pr/library/2003/oct/20itunes.html.
13
 Codified in 17 §107.  Use will be considered fair (and consequently non-infringing) according 
to the four following criteria: 
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial nature or 
is for nonprofit educational purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a 
whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work.
5I. A Brief History of Copyright
The first copyright statute14 in the United Kingdom15 was essentially a privilege 
granted by the Crown to authors and publishers to prevent reuse by other publishers.  It 
seems to have been derived from  a previous act designed to limit publications to 
authorized publishers16. In other words, it was a “professional right,” used mostly by 
professionals against other professionals: Certain commercial entities waited to see which 
books were selling well and then started to copy them.  This created a free-rider system, 
which was rather inefficient from a commercial standpoint: publishers had little incentive 
to invest in the publication of new books and authors were suffering from the narrow 
bandwidth for the dissemination of their books.  This “free” and rather raw capitalism 
thus led to a market failure in the book trade that had to be regulated. 
On the Continent things were taking a different route.  While events paralleled 
those in the UK (there were printing privileges in Italy and pre-Revolution France since 
at least the early 17th century) for several decades, things took a different turn at the end 
of the 18th century: Authors’ rights were born in the purest tradition of human rights, i.e.,
as natural rights.  As such, they had special status and could not easily be limited by the 
State, politically or legally.  
14
 Prior to the Statute of Anne (see next note), there had been no copyright proper. Artists in 
classical Greece and the Roman Empire did not seek personal attribution, and it was common to 
identify someone else (a teacher, a famous person) as the “author.”  During the early and middle 
Middle Ages (approximately from the 8th to the 12th century), almost all artistic works were 
created in Europe under the patronage of the Roman Catholic Church, which became de facto the 
owner of all “works.”  Michelangelo was one of the first artists under Church patronage to insist 
on personal attribution.  The insistence of the personal role of the author and the recognition of 
the link between authors and works is mostly a child of the Enlightenment, with, e.g.,  Kant’s 
(and later Hegel’s) view that the author infused his or her will into the work.  See Harold C. 
Streibich, The Moral Right of Ownership to Intellectual Property: Part I - From the Beginning to 
the Age of Printing, 6 Mem. St. U. L. Rev. 1 (1975); Dan Rosen, Artists’ Moral Rights: A 
European Evolution, An American Revolution, 2 Cardozo Arts & Ent. L.J. 155 (1983);Cheryl 
Swack, Safeguarding Artistic Creation and the Cultural Heritage: A Comparison of Droit Moral 
Between France and the United States, 22 Colum.-VLA J.L. & Arts 361 (1998).
15 Statute of Anne, 1710, 8 Ann., c. 19 (Eng.).
16 This is the argument made in L. Ray Patterson and Craig Joyce, Copyright in 1791: An Essay 
Concerning the Founders’ View of the Copyright Power Granted to Congress in Article I, Section 
8, Clause 8 of the U.S. Constitution, 52 Emory L.J. 909, 916 (2003).
6But here again the rights were exercised mostly against infringers who were, by 
and large, either small-time pirates, or professionals lacking a certain ethical view of 
publishing (truth be told, the boundary between authorized reuse of existing material and 
infringement was not and is not always clear.)  Authors were also able to use their new 
human right against publishers who exploited them beyond what they considered to be an 
acceptable limit.  
The history of copyright and authors’ rights in the decades that follow is 
essentially that of an adaptation to new forms of creation (e.g, cinema) and, more 
importantly, of new ways to disseminate copyrighted works (radio, then television 
broadcasting, cable, satellite).  The result is a bundle composed of “copyright rights” i.e.,
a list of specific rights in respect of particular forms of exploitation of works 
(reproduction, public performance/communication to the public, adaptation, etc.).  
It is important to add, however, that from the 18th century until the 1990’s, those 
copyright rights were aimed at, and used against professional entities, either legitimate 
entities such as broadcasters, cable companies or distributors; or illegitimate ones such as 
cassette and CD pirates.  In most cases, these professionals were intermediaries with no 
interest in the content itself (i.e., they could have sold shoes instead of movies).  Their job 
was to get content to end-users, most of whom were consumers and of no interest to 
copyright law (or lawyers).
A fundamental shift has occurred since digital technology and especially the 
Internet: copyright is now a legal tool that rightsholders can use against end-users, 
including consumers17.  Rightsholders want to use the copyright tools at their disposal for 
a dual purpose: ensuring that end-users pay the fee for the material they use (which they 
17 See Press Release, Recording Industry Association of America, Recording Industry Begins 
Suing P2P File Sharers Who Illegally Offer Copyrighted Music Online, (Sept. 8, 2003), at
http://www.riaa.com/news/newsletter/090803.asp. See also John Borland, RIAA sues 261 file 
swappers, CNET News.com, at http://news.com.com/2100-1023-5072564.html?tag=nl (Sept. 8, 
7see as including getting access through authorized sources), and preventing the 
transmission of the material by those “end”-users to other users (in other words 
preventing them from becoming intermediaries). To put it bluntly, rightsholders want to 
ensure they want to ensure that end-users remain just that, end-users.
Individual users on the other hand want to harness the enormous capabilities of 
the Internet to access, use and disseminate information and content.  The demand is huge 
and ever increasing.  Internet technology has responded to this huge pull not only by 
providing the initial adequate technological means but by responding to legal barriers by 
providing new ones: close Napster and peer-to-peer emerges. Try to shut P2P down, as 
was done in the recent wave of subpoenas and law suits against individual file 
“sharers18,” and quite predictably another technology will surface: anonymous file 
exchange systems, thus defeating any subpoena served on the ISP.19 Because ISPs will 
not know the identity of users who are exchanging music files, subpoenas will be 
ineffective.  In a similar vein, if a way is found to block music files, software that 
disguises the music content will be invented.20  In short, users seem poised to win this 
war and commentators are already saying that the music industry will be lucky to be 
around to lick its wounds. 
The best way forward for the music industry is to completely redefine old 
business models based on albums, physical copies (CDs) and, more importantly, the 
2003) and John Borland, RIAA files 80 new file-swapping suits, CNET News.com, at
http://news.com.com/2100-1027-5099738.html (October 30, 2003).
18 Id. 
19 See Recording Indus. Ass’n of Am., Inc. v. Verizon Internet Servs. 257 F. Supp. 2d 244 (D.C. 
2003).  CNet reported the increasing use of proxies to ensure the anonymity of file-sharers. See
John Borland,  Covering tracks: New privacy hope for P2P, CNET News, Feb. 24, 2004. 
Available at <http://news.com.com/2100-1027-5164413.html>(Accessed Feb. 25, 2004). Another 
example is programmer Wyatt Wasicek has created a program called AnonX that masks the 
Internet address of people who use file-sharing programs such as Kazaa. Wasicek promises not to 
divulge his 7,000 users’ Internet addresses, and believes he cannot be forced to do so. See
<http://www.siliconvalley.com/mld/siliconvalley/news/editorial/7927993.htm>.  
20 Regularly, new technologies that promise to stop P2P sharing of copyrighted material (such as 
Audible Magic) emerge, usually with some concerns about privacy. See John Borland, “File-swap 
‘killer’ grabs attention,” CNet News, March 3, 2004. Available at < http://news.com.com/2100-
1025_3-5168505.html> (accessed March 4, 2003).
8abandonment of the scarcity paradigm.  Information is not valuable on the Internet 
because it is scarce; it is valuable because it is found.
The commercial and public relations cost of trying to apply copyright to end-users 
illustrates a simple fact: that is not what copyright was meant to do.  The history and 
underlying policy objectives of copyright indicate that  is a right to be exercised by and 
against professionals. One should add to this equation the fact that copyright was always 
used to regulate and organize markets when a new form of dissemination was invented. 
The Internet is, from this perspective, probably the biggest jump in technological terms 
and copyright was used not to organize the music market but rather to deny it. That will 
not work. Copyright is not a dam, it s a river.21 It was always used to channel use and 
optimize exploitation, not to entirely shut out a new medium.
Following the same train of thought, exceptions and limitations to copyright were 
also mostly written in the days of the professional intermediary as user. This explains 
why in several national laws, the main exceptions can be grouped into two categories: 
private use, which governments previously regarded as “unregulatable” and where 
copyright law abdicated its authority by nature; and use by specific professional 
intermediaries: libraries (and archives) and certain public institutions, including schools, 
courts and sometimes the government itself.  There are still today several very broad 
exceptions for “private use” (e.g., Italy, Japan) that were adopted in the days when the 
end-user was just that, the end of the distribution chain. 
The result of those exceptions expressed, in a US context, as a combination of fair 
use and the first-sale doctrine,22 meant that end-users were trusted by the copyright 
21
 The successes of publishers of scientific and medical journals show that using copyright norms 
in the Internet environment is possible. By making journals available online and leveraging the 
technology to provide, e.g., raw lab data or files containing three-dimensional images, those 
publishers, who still sell plenty of paper copies, have increased total revenues. The key is to trust
users, and let them use the material. Trust was always implicit in pre-Internet days, with legal 
devices such as the first-sale doctrine, private copying exceptions, fair use, etc.
22 See R. Anthony Reese, The First Sale Doctrine in the Era of Digital Networks, 44 B.C. L. Rev. 
577 (2003). (“For at least ninety-five years, the first sale doctrine in U.S. copyright law has 
9industries23.  Users enjoyed both “room to move” because of exceptions such as fair use 
and rights stemming from their ownership of a physical copy.24
The fact that private use is not expressly mentioned as an exception in a number 
of national laws or the Berne Convention is not surprising: it was of little interest to 
copyright holders until the invention of the VCR and double-deck cassette players, which 
only became popular in the 1970’s.  A number of countries then introduced regulation not
to stop the practice (and there were famous court cases where this was tried, including the 
Sony case in the US25), but rather to compensate rightsholders by introducing levies on 
blank tapes and, in certain cases, on recording equipment as well.26 The inapplicability 
of analog exceptions to the Internet is illustrated by the debate concerning § 110(2) of the 
US Copyright Act.  It contains limitations on the nature and content of the transmission, 
and the identity and location of the recipients.  As was noted by the United States 
allowed those who buy copies of a copyrighted work to resell, rent, or lend those copies. 
Copyright law is often viewed as a balance of providing authors with sufficient incentives to 
create their works and maximizing public access to those works. And the first sale doctrine has 
been a major bulwark in providing public access by facilitating the existence of used book and 
record stores, video rental stores, and, perhaps most significantly, public libraries.”)
23
 Not that they liked it. The battle against the VCR is a good example. Of course, today video 
sales and rentals generate a substantial chunk of change for the film industry.
24 The Canadian Supreme Court in the 2002 case of Théberge v. Galeries d’art du Petit 
Champlain, Inc., [2002] SCC 34, wrote an interesting comment on this point: “Excessive control 
by holders of copyrights and other forms of intellectual property may unduly limit the ability of 
the public domain to incorporate and embellish creative innovation in the long-term interests of 
society as a whole, or create practical obstacles to proper utilization. This is reflected in the 
exceptions to copyright […]  such as fair dealing [..]. This case demonstrates the basic economic 
conflict between the holder of the intellectual property in a work and the owner of the tangible 
property that embodies the copyrighted expressions.” (emphasis added)
25 Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 78 L. Ed. 2d 574, 104 S. Ct. 774 
(1984).
26 P. BERNT HUGENHOLTZ et al., INSTITUTE FOR INFORMATION LAW, THE FUTURE OF LEVIES IN 
A DIGITAL ENVIRONMENT 9 (2003), available at
http://www.ivir.nl/publications/other/DRM%20Levies%20Final%20Report.pdf: “Historically, 
copyright levy systems have been premised on the assumption that certain uses, especially private 
copying, of protected works cannot be controlled and exploited individually. With the advent of 
digital rights management (DRM) this assumption must be re-examined. […] Where such 
individual rights management is available there would appear to remain no need, and no 
justification, for mandatory levy systems”.
10
Register of Copyrights in her May 1999 Report on Copyright and Digital Distance 
Education27:
“As written, section 110(2) has only limited application to courses offered over a 
digital network. Because it exempts only acts of performance or display, it would not 
authorize the acts of reproduction or distribution involved in this type of digital 
transmission. In addition, students who choose to take a distance course without special 
circumstances that prevent their attendance in classrooms may not qualify as eligible 
recipients.” 28
Quite logically, the report recommends updating section 110(2) “to allow the 
same activities to take place using digital delivery mechanisms, while controlling the 
risks involved, would continue the basic policy balance struck in 1976.”29  Such an 
adaptation of 15 USC 110(2) is possible because it still applies to professional users, 
namely educators.  In the case of individual users, the rightsholder’s unwillingness to 
trust those users and the need to technologically enforce use legal and/or contractual use 
restrictions has led not only o a refusal to consider new exceptions but in fact to efforts to 
radically reduce any room to move left for those users.30
27 MARYBETH PETERS, U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, REPORT ON COPYRIGHT AND DIGITAL 
DISTANCE EDUCATION, available at http://www.copyright.gov/reports/de_rprt.pdf (May 1999).
28 Id. at vii-viii.
29 Id. at xv.  
30 The image of “fared use” has been mentioned in this connection. See Tom W. Bell, Fair Use vs 
Fared Use: The Impact of Automated Rights Management on Copyright's Fair Use Doctrine, 76 
N.C. L. Rev. 557, 559 (1998): “[automated rights management (ARM)] enables information 
providers to enforce standard copyright claims mechanically, without resort to the threat of 
litigation. It also allows copyright owners and others to create and enforce contracts that specify 
other sets of rights. Although ARM may give information providers newfound power to control 
the use of their wares, it does not necessarily justify that control. The proper legal response to 
ARM thus remains an open--and vital—question.”
“ARM portends far-reaching and unprecedented effects on rights to information in the new digital 
intermedia. Specifically, ARM threatens to reduce radically the scope of the fair use defense to 
copyright infringement. ARM will interact with existing legal doctrines to supplant fair use with 
an analogous but distinctly different doctrine: fared use.”
11
II. The “Problem with Copyright”
Is the copyright deer stuck in policy headlights?  To a certain extent, the answer is 
yes, but only if one tries to fit too much into the copyright house.  Copyright was, as a 
regulatory vehicle, a way to maintain the necessary level of scarcity among professionals
who create, publish and disseminate material embodying human intellectual creativity so 
as to allow the development of an organized marketplace.  In other words, copyright 
works well as a regulation of commercial intercourse.  Extant exceptions to copyright 
protection discussed above show that it is not well adapted to, and was not meant to 
control private use by individuals. 
The problem stems in large part from the way copyright rights were expressed, in 
turn a direct reflection of its history. From its very beginning in the 1710 Statute of 
Anne31, where copyright was presented as a way to promote the creation and 
dissemination of new works by protecting publishers from free-riding by other 
publishers, to today’s copyright legislation and international treaties, including the Berne 
Convention32 and TRIPS Agreement33, copyright has been expressed in terms of rights 
attaching to the nature of the use, not to its effect.  In other words, rights have been 
granted with respect to acts of reproduction, performance, adaptation, etc.  But was this 
ever the true focus of copyright policy? I suggest that its actual target was commercial 
use and reuse and the prevention of free-riding by competitors, including of course true 
commercial pirates34. 
31 See supra note 15.
32
 Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1886, revised at 
Paris July 24, 1971, 25 UST 1341, 828 U.N.T.S. 221 (hereinafter Berne Convention).
33
 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh 
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY 
ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS: THE LEGAL TEXTS, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299, 33 
I.L.M. 1125, 1197 (hereinafter TRIPS Agreement).
34
 The comment is limited to the so-called economic rights.  Interestingly, where moral rights 
exist, a case can be made that (a) the test if not nature but effect and (b) the rationale is partly non 
commercial.  First, the standard test for the right of integrity is, as expressed in Article 6bis of the 
Berne Convention, a right to oppose “any distortion, mutilation or other modification of, or 
12
I suggest that the time is ripe to abandon this legislative approach based on the 
nature of the act of use and focus instead on its effect. Isn’t that, after all, what 
rightsholders care about?  What the rightsholder in a film wants is to control and 
presumably be paid for the broadcasting of the film, not the number of transient, 
ephemeral other reproductions made, the fact that the work is “ performed”, 
“communicated” or “transmitted by Hertzian waves,” wire, wireless networks or 
otherwise.  Rightsholders care about such distinctions to the extent that they represent or 
affect markets. Otherwise, the technical requirements for the use of their content are 
irrelevant.  Professional users similarly want to be authorized to perform commercial 
operations (e.g., a certain form of broadcasting at a certain date etc.)  independently of 
what the actual technical requirements are for this operation to be successfully 
performed.  Yet, today copyright focuses instead only on the technical nature of the use. 
Exceptions in many national laws for ephemeral recordings are a powerful 
symptom of the malaise.  Broadcasting usually requires temporary copies to be made. 
Because the real act to be considered is the broadcasting, not temporary copying, many 
legislators opted to exempt the act of copying from copyright infringement liability.  
Otherwise, the user’s need for an authorization would have been compounded by the fact 
that the various fragments of the copyright bundle (reproduction, public performance in 
various forms and media etc.) may very well be owned by different rightsholders, thus 
requiring multiple authorizations for a single economic operation35. 
derogatory action in relation to, the said work, which would be prejudicial to [the author’s] honor 
or reputation.” The nature of the act clause in this Article, namely “distortion, mutilation or other 
modification of, or derogatory action in relation t” is very broad, so broad in fact as to become a 
non condition. The real test is the effect of the act, i.e., the prejudice to the author’s honor or 
reputation.  The rationale of this right is partly commercial (maintaining the integrity of the work) 
as is the rationale for the right to claim authorship, the other part of the 6bis rights (ensuring that 
the source is acknowledged).   But part of the rationale stems, historically, from a 18th century 
civil law worldview that saw a permanent tether between the author and her creation, 
independently of any transfer of the work (as a object) and/or intellectual property rights therein.  
35 See Daniel Gervais & Alana Maurushat, Fragmented Copyright, Fragmented Management: 
Proposals to Defrag Copyright Management, 2 Can. J. of L. & Tech. 15 (2003).
13
This poses new problems in the Internet environment, where most acts of use have 
a dual nature from a copyright law standpoint.  Any content made available on a server is 
usually reproduced and performed/ communicated. To make matters worse, in 
implementing the 1996 WIPO Treaties36, certain countries have introduced a new right or 
fragment, usually called the “making available” right37.  A single economic operation in 
that context may require three or more separate authorizations, possibly leading to over-
or split payments (because often each rightsholder will want to be paid for the entire 
economic value of the operation) and almost certainly to high if not insurmountable 
rights clearance processes and transaction costs. 
The “problem with copyright” was illustrated in the US Eldred v. Ashcroft38 case. 
While ostensibly the plaintiff was trying to obtain a declaration of unconstitutionality of 
the extension of the term of copyright protection, I would argue that a proper rescoping of 
the right or more precisely the replacement of the nature of the prohibition(s) it purports 
to effectuate would eliminate a significant portion of the criticisms leveled at copyright 
law, especially in respect of its chilling effect39, its impact of the public domain and 
36 World Intellectual Property Organisation Copyright Treaty, Dec. 20, 1996, S. Treaty Doc. No. 
105-17 at 1 (1997), 36 I.L.M. 65 (hereinafter WIPO Copyright Treaty) and the World Intellectual 
Property Organisation Performances and Phonograms Treaty, Dec. 20, 1996, S. Treaty Doc. No. 
105-17 at 18 (1997), 36 I.L.M. 76 (hereinafter WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty).
37 See WIPO Copyright Treaty, Art. 8: “Without prejudice to the provisions of Articles 11(1)(ii), 
11bis(1)(i) and (ii), 11ter(1)(ii), 14(1)(ii) and 14bis(1) of the Berne Convention, authors of 
literary and artistic works shall enjoy the exclusive right of authorizing any communication to the 
public of their works, by wire or wireless means, including the making available to the public of 
their works in such a way that members of the public may access these works from a place and at 
a time individually chosen by them”. See also WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty, Art. 
8, 10, 12, 14 and 19. See, e.g., Japan’s copyright legislation: Copyright Law, Law No.48 of 1970, 
as amended, art.18.
38
 537 U.S. 186 (2003)
39 See Neil Weinstock Netanel, Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society, 106 Yale L.J. 283 
(1996). See also Lawrence Lessig, Protecting Mickey Mouse at Art's Expense, N.Y. Times, Jan. 
18, 2003, at A17: “Still, missing from the opinion was any justification for perhaps the most 
damaging part of Congress's decision to extend existing copyrights for 20 years: the extension 
unnecessarily stifles freedom of expression by preventing the artistic and educational use even of 
content that no longer has any commercial value.” See also, Brief of Intellectual Property Law 
Professors as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, available at
http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/openlaw/eldredvashcroft/supct/amici/ip-lawprofs.pdf. 
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ability to use material to create new works.40  In other words, a properly defined set of 
copyright norms would make the negative impact of its duration much less significant. 
To abandon the nature of the act approach in favor of an effects-based test is not 
only possible, but I submit encouraged by both the main international treaties and 
national legislation, at least in the United States. This requires us to take a brief look at 
the types of exceptions currently in existence.
III. Comparative and International Analysis of Exceptions to Copyright  
Our analysis of the different nature of exceptions to copyright rights will consider 
first the Berne Convention, and especially the three-step test, which will be the basis of 
our suggested new core norm. We will also examine briefly the most relevant European 
Union Directive and then consider the four main models of exceptions and limitations 
contained in national copyright laws.
A. The Berne Convention
The Berne Convention contains a general rule, known as the “three-step test”, 
which guides national legislators but only with respect to the right of reproduction41.  It 
may be useful to recall that the so-called three-step allows exceptions to the reproduction 
right
- in certain special cases;
- that do not conflict with the normal commercial exploitation of the work; and
- do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the author.
40
 An interesting but somewhat different analysis was proposed by Professor Wagner on this 
question. See R. Polk Wagner, Information Wants to Be Free: Intellectual Property and the 
Mythologies of Control, 103 Columbia L. R. 385 (2003).
41 See DANIEL GERVAIS, THE TRIPS AGREEMENT: DRAFTING HISTORY AND ANALYSIS (2nd ed. 
2003), at 144-7 and Mihály Fiscor,  How Much of What? The Three-Step Test and its Application 
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B. Analysis of the three-step test
The three-step test has become the cornerstone for almost all exceptions to all 
intellectual property rights at the international level.  It has been used as the model for 
exceptions to all copyright rights in the TRIPS Agreement42 (Article 13), to the rights 
created by the WIPO Copyright Treaty43 (Article 10) and the WIPO Performances and 
Phonograms Treaty (Article 16).  Interestingly, in the TRIPS Agreement, it is also the 
basis for exceptions to industrial design protection (Article 26(2)), and patent rights 
(Article 30).  There is, however, a crucial difference in the case of patent rights: The last 
(third) step of the test [does]not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the 
patent owner, taking account of the legitimate interests of third parties.44” (emphasis 
added).  
1. “Certain special cases” 
In his seminal book on the Berne Convention45, Professor Sam Ricketson opines 
that “special” means that the exception must have a purpose and be justified by public 
in Two Recent WTO Dispute settlement Cases, 192 Revue internationale du droit d’auteur 111, 
231-242 (2002).  
42 The TRIPS Agreement also contains a list of material excluded for copyrightability (Article 
9(2)), namely “ideas, procedures, methods of operation or mathematical concepts as such.”  It also 
extended in its Article 13 the three-step test of the Berne Convention to cover any copyright right 
(including, e.g., public performance).  
43 This treaty was implemented in the United States by the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 
Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998) (hereinafter DMCA).  The WIPO Copyright and 
Performances and Phonograms Treaties Implementation Act of 1998 is title I of the DMCA.  The 
treaty has at least two interesting features for our purposes, namely the application of the three-
step test in its Article 10 and the following declaration in its preamble: “Recognizing the need to 
maintain a balance between the rights of authors and the larger public interest, particularly 
education, research and access to information, as reflected in the Berne Convention.”
44 I am indebted to Dr. Mihály Ficsor, who shared his views on the WTO panel decision dealing 
with §110(5) of the U.S. Copyright Act. See Mihály, supra note 35. 
45 SAM RICKETSON, THE BERNE CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF LITERARY AND ARTISTIC 
WORKS, 1886-1986 (1987)
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policy46.  This purpose-oriented or teleological interpretation of the Convention is 
reinforced by the use of the phrase “to the extent justified by the purpose” in Articles 
10(1) and 10(2) (which allow exceptions to be made for quotation and teaching), and 
Article 10bis(2) (which allows reporting of current events).  The purpose of public 
information is clearly the basis for the latter exception and for the possible exclusion 
from copyright of certain official texts.  
In the 2001 WTO panel decision concerning section 110(5) of the US Copyright 
Act47, the first part of the three-step test, namely the meaning of “special,” was 
interpreted for the first time by an international tribunal.  The approach taken was to first 
politely exclude Ricketson’s view48 and essentially to look at the Oxford dictionary49:
“The term ‘special’ connotes ‘having an individual or limited application or 
purpose’, ‘containing details; precise, specific’, ‘exceptional in quality or 
degree; unusual; out of the ordinary’ or ‘distinctive in some way’.[here was a 
footnote referring to the Oxford dictionary]  This term means that more is 
needed than a clear definition in order to meet the standard of the first condition.  
In addition, an exception or limitation must be limited in its field of application 
or exceptional in its scope.  In other words, an exception or limitation should be 
narrow in quantitative as well as a qualitative sense50.” 
The approach chosen is understandable. For valid policy reasons51, the WTO 
Appellate Body has preferred to stick with the ordinary meaning of words, in part to 
avoid introducing unbargained for concessions in the WTO legal framework52.  In the 
46 Id. at 482.
47
 United-States – Section 110(5) of the US Copyright Act, WTO Document WT/DS160/R, June 
15, 2000 (hereinafter Panel Report).
48 Id. at note 114. 
49 Id. ¶¶ 6.108-6.110.
50 Id. ¶ 6.109.
51
 Essentially, that trade-agreements are bargained for and should not, therefore, be “completed” 
or amended by interpretation. See, e.g,. United States - Standards for Reformulated and 
Conventional Gasoline, WTO document WT/DS2/AB/R, in which the Appellate Body stated that 
“applying the basic principle of interpretation that the words of a treaty, like the General 
Agreement, are to be given their ordinary meaning, in their context and in the light of the treaty’s 
object and purpose.”
52 See Gervais supra note 35, at 146.
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110(5) case, however, there were two problems with this approach.  First, Ricketson’s 
“view” was solidly anchored in the history and the text of the Convention. Second, the 
logic of the WTO panel’s reasoning is incomplete.  How helpful is it, from a legal 
standpoint, to say that “special” means either “limited in its field of application or
exceptional in its scope”?  The former criterion is not very restrictive, the second clearly 
is. More importantly, the last sentence of the above quote from the case does not logically 
follow from what precedes. It is not because an exception must be “limited in its field of 
application” that one can conclude that it must therefore be “narrow in quantitative as 
well as a qualitative sense.”  This is a huge logical jump which in fact elevates the 
threshold of acceptable exceptions under Berne. 
I previously argued53 that the three-step test in really a two-step test and that little 
time should be spent on finding the proper meaning of “special”.  Indeed, if the meaning 
of “special” as used in Article 13 of TRIPS and Article 9(2) of the Berne Convention is 
that there should be a sound policy justification, few countries will act in a purely 
arbitrary way. In addition, WTO panels should not try to step into the shoes of national 
policy makers.  If its meaning is that the exception should somehow be circumscribed, all 
exceptions should fit the mould.  Indeed, while the “dictionary approach” seems a much 
safer alternative for WTO panels in most cases, in the 110(5) case it was mostly useless.  
Any exception to copyright is arguably “special,” because any exception short of a 
complete repeal of the Copyright Act would arguably be “limited in its field of 
application.”
The two steps in the test that can truly be operationalized are thus the 
“interference with commercial exploitation” and the “unreasonable prejudice to the 
legitimate interests of the author”.
2. Interference with normal commercial exploitation
53 See id. 
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What is the meaning of “exploitation” in the  context of this second step of the 
test?  It seems fairly straightforward: any use of the work by which the copyright owner 
tries to extract/maximize the value of her right.  “Normal” is more troublesome. Does it 
refer to what is simply “common” or does it refer to a normative standard?  The question 
is relevant in particular for new forms and emerging business models which have not thus 
far been common or “normal” in an empirical sense.  During the last substantive revision 
of the Berne Convention in Stockholm in 1968, the concept was clearly used to refer to 
“all forms of exploiting a work which had, or were likely to acquire, considerable 
economic or practical importance54.”   It thus seems that the condition is normative in 
nature: an exception is not allowed if it covers any form of exploitation which has, or is 
likely to acquire, considerable importance.  In other words, if the exception is used to 
limit a commercially significant market or, a fortiori, to enter into competition with the 
copyright holder, the exception is prohibited55.  
We can, therefore, agree with the WTO panel on this point. It concluded as 
follows:
“[…] it appears that one way of measuring the normative connotation of normal 
exploitation is to consider, in addition to those forms of exploitation that 
currently generate significant or tangible revenue, those forms of exploitation 
which, with a certain degree of likelihood and plausibility, could acquire 
considerable economic or practical importance.”56.
54 RECORDS OF THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CONFERENCE OF STOCKHOLM, JUNE 11 TO JULY 
14, 1967, WIPO, Geneva (1971), at 112 (hereinafter Records of the Stockholm Conference).
55 One could see the scope of an exception based on non commercially significant use in H.R. 
3261, 108th Cong. (2003), known as the Act to Prohibit the Misappropriation of Certain 
Databases, §4(b) of which would allow the “making available in commerce of a substantial part 
of a database by a nonprofit educational, scientific, and research institution, including an 
employee or agent of such institution acting within the scope of such employment or agency, for 
nonprofit educational, scientific, and research purposes […]if the court determines that the 
making available in commerce of the information in the database is reasonable under the 
circumstances, taking into consideration the customary practices associated with such uses of 
such database by nonprofit educational, scientific, or research institutions and other factors that 
the court determines relevant.”
56
 Panel Report, supra note 41, at ¶ 6.180.
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3. Unreasonable prejudice to legitimate interests of rightsholder
The third step is perhaps the most difficult. What is an “unreasonable prejudice,” 
and what are “legitimate interests”? 
Let us start with “legitimate.” It can have two meanings: (a) conformable to, 
sanctioned or authorized by, law or principle; lawful, justifiable; proper; or (b) normal; 
regular; conformable to a recognized type. To put it differently, are legitimate interests 
only “legal interests”? I do not believe so.  I suggest that the third step is the clearest 
indication of the need to balance the rights of copyright holders and users anywhere in 
the Berne Convention.  An analysis of the Records of the Stockholm Conference shows 
that the United Kingdom took the view that legitimate meant simply “sanctioned by law,” 
while other countries seems to take a broader view, meaning “justifiable” in the sense 
that they are supported by social norms and relevant public policies57.  In my view, and it 
seems to be the approach taken by the WTO panel58, the combination of the notion of 
“prejudice” with that of “interests” points quite clearly towards a legal-normative 
approach.  In other words, “legitimate interests” are those that are protected by law.  The 
interpretation might be different if the third step of the test was formulated as “the 
reproduction not contrary to the legitimate interests of the author.” With the unreasonable 
prejudice element, however, the legitimate interests are almost by definition legal 
interests.  
This leaves open one key question:  what does “unreasonable prejudice” mean59. 
Clearly, the word “unreasonable” indicates that some level or degree of prejudice is 
justified. To buttress this view, the French version of the Berne Convention, which 
57 See Records of the Stockholm Conference, supra note 48.
58
 Panel Report, supra note 41, at ¶¶ 6.223-6.229.  At paragraph 6.224 the panel somehow tried to 
reconcile the two approaches: “the term relates to lawfulness from a legal positivist perspective, 
but it has also the connotation of legitimacy from a more normative perspective, in the context of 
calling for the protection of interests that are justifiable in the light of the objectives that underlie 
the protection of exclusive rights.”
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governs in case of a discrepancy60, uses the expression “préjudice injustifié ,” which one 
would be tempted to translate as “unjustified prejudice.”  The translators opted instead for
“not unreasonable.” 61
I would suggest that the inclusion of a reasonableness/justifiability criterion is a 
key that allows legislators to establish a balance between, on the one hand, the rights of 
authors and other copyright holders and the needs and interests of users, on the other.  
This seems even clearer when the French term (“unjustified”) is used.  In other words, 
there must be a public interest justification  to limit copyright.  
As a result, I cannot agree with the WTO panel, which essentially conflated the 
second and third steps when it concluded that “prejudice to the legitimate interests of 
right holders reaches an unreasonable level if an exception or limitation causes or has the 
potential to cause an unreasonable loss of income to the copyright owner62.”  A public 
interest imperative may lead a government to impose an exception to copyright that may 
translate into a loss of revenue for copyright holders. It can nonetheless be “justified”.  In 
addition, by focusing on economic harm, the panel may have considerably expanded the 
scope of exceptions: it is not the fact that a user obtained some value that is 
determinative, but rather the fact that a rightsholder can show that it lost actual value 
(revenue), i.e, the existence of a prejudice. This view is reinforced by the arbitration 
decision and the fact that non-implementation leads to a determination of the level of 
harm suffered.63
59 It is worth noting that “not unreasonable prejudice” is not quite the same as “reasonable 
prejudice.”  “Not unreasonable” seems to connote a slightly stricter threshold (See Panel Report,
supra note 41 at ¶ 6.225).  
60
 Berne Convention, supra note 26, at Art. 31.
61
 Records of the Stockholm Conference, supra note 48, at 1145 § 84.
62 Panel Report, supra note 41, ¶ 6.229.
63 Under the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) that governs the WTO dispute-settlement 
process, a party may ask for arbitration if another party fails to implement an adopted panel (or 
Appellate Body) decision.  Because the US failed to implement the Panel report (which is still 
true as of March 2004-- the WTO had ordered the United States to bring the exemption in line 
with the Panel’s ruling by July 27, 2001),  the European Union asked for arbitration and  decision 
on the level of harm, which was determined to be $1.1 million/year.  The European Union has 
proposed levying a fee on copyrighted material against United States nationals unless the United 
States reforms its law. See World Trade Organization Dispute Settlement Panel on United States--
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Let us look at national and regional legislation to determine the parameters of exceptions 
to copyright.
C. European “InfoSoc” Directive
The European Union’s Information Society (“InfoSoc”) Directive64 contains two 
sets of exceptions. The first, and only mandatory, exception is for transient copies 
“forming an integral and essential part of a technological process.”  Otherwise, the 
Directive contains an exhaustive list of permitted exceptions (i.e., exceptions that EU 
member States may choose to use in their national copyright legislation).  These are all 
purpose-specific exceptions. There is no set of criteria comparable to the US fair use 
doctrine65. 
However, the preamble to this Directive, which serves as a guideline for the 
interpretation of the operative part of the text66, refers to permitting “exceptions or 
limitations in the public interest for the purpose of education and teaching” and to the 
need to safeguard a “fair balance of rights and interests between the different categories 
of rightsholders, as well as between the different categories of rightsholders and users” 
through exceptions and limitations, which “have to be reassessed in the light of the new 
electronic environment.”67
Section 110(5) of the U.S. Copyright Act, WT/DS160/22 (Mar. 1, 2002); World Trade 
Organization Dispute Settlement Panel on United States--Section 110(5) of the U.S. Copyright 
Act, WT/DS160/12 (Feb. 19, 2002); World Trade Organization Dispute Settlement Panel on 
United States-- Section 110(5) of the U.S. Copyright Act, WT/DS160/19 (Jan. 11, 2002); World 
Trade Organization Dispute Settlement Panel on United States--Section 110(5) of the U.S. 
Copyright Act, WT/DS160/12 (Jan. 15, 2001).
64 Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2001 on the 
Harmonisation of Certain Aspects of Copyright and Related Rights in the Information Society. 
65
 As embodied in 17 USC §107. See supra note 13.
66 Directive 2001/29/EC, supra note 57.
67 Directive 2001/29/EC, supra note 57, ¶ 14 and ¶ 31.
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Otherwise, the Directive also refers to the three-step test as an overarching test for 
all permitted exceptions. Article 5(5) reads: 
“The exceptions and limitations provided for in paragraphs 1, 2, 3 and 4 shall only 
be applied in certain special cases which do not conflict with a normal exploitation 
of the work or other subject matter and do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate 
interests of the rightholder.”
D. National Laws
Exceptions in national copyright laws can be grouped under four main headings. 
The first, I reserve for fair use68 and do not need to belabor its content here.
1. Fair dealing
A second category is the fair dealing approach of other common law countries, 
generally modeled after the UK Copyright Act of 191169.  These consist of a list of 
situations where “dealing” with a protected work is permitted combined with a 
requirement that the use be fair in light of the purpose.  These specific purposes are 
usually related to criticism and review, news reporting, teaching, archives and libraries, 
use by visually impaired readers, etc70.  In a recent Canadian Supreme Court decision, the 
research component was interpreted very broadly, apparently covering even for-profit 
research71. The fairness criterion usually requires that no more of the work be used than 
was necessary for the (authorized) purpose72.
68 See supra note 13.
69
 Copyright Act, 1911, 1 & 2 Geo. 5, c. 46 (Eng.)
70 See, e.g. Copyright Act, R.S.C., c. C-42, §§ 29-30 (1985) (Can.), Copyright Act 1968, c.63 as 
amended, §§ 40-42 (Austl.), and Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, c.48, §§ 29 - 30 
(Eng.).
71 CCH v. Law Society of Upper Canada, [2004] SCC 13 (Can). (“The fair dealing exception 
under s. 29 is open to those who can show that their dealings with a copyrighted work were for 
the purpose of research or private study. ‘Research’ must be given a large and liberal 
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Commonwealth members are not the only countries where fair dealing exists. 
Israel has a fair dealing with civil law overtones.  According to Sec. 2(1) of the Copyright 
Act, 191173, fair dealing for the purposes of private study, research, criticism and review, 
or to make a journalistic summary is allowed. Interestingly, however, in determining 
whether a particular dealing was fair, the Israeli Supreme Court used the US fair use 
criteria.74  The “desirable social goal” was clearly mentioned as a relevant criterion.75
There are additional exceptions for private recording76, public recitation77 and 
education,78 and good faith is considered a defense against all remedies except 
injunction79.
2. Civil law enumeration approach
The third category is that used in most civil law countries, where certain very 
narrow uses are allowed without authorization and usually without an express 
interpretation in order to ensure that users’ rights are not unduly constrained. I agree with the 
Court of Appeal that research is not limited to non-commercial or private contexts.”) (Emphasis 
added)
72 See idem. (“the following factors [should]be considered in assessing whether a dealing was fair: 
(1) the purpose of the dealing; (2) the character of the dealing; (3) the amount of the dealing; (4) 
alternatives to the dealing; (5) the nature of the work; and (6) the effect of the dealing on the 
work. Although these considerations will not all arise in every case of fair dealing, this list of 
factors provides a useful analytical framework to govern determinations of fairness in future 
cases.”) See also WILLIAM PATRY, THE FAIR USE PRIVILEGE IN COPYRIGHT LAW, (2nd ed., 
1995), at 594-599. See also JAMES LAHORE & WARWICK A. ROTHNIE, COPYRIGHT AND DESIGNS
(2003) at §§ 40.050, 40.065 and 40.115-40.130 (Austl.); WILLIAM CORNISH & DAVID 
LLEWELYN, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: PATENTS, COPYRIGHT, TRADEMARKS AND ALLIED 
RIGHTS, (5th ed., 2003), at 440-448 (Eng.); and DAVID VAVER, COPYRIGHT LAW (2000), at § Fair 
Dealing (Can.).
73
 Copyright Act, 1911, 1 and 2 Geo. 5, ch. 46, (Extension to Palestine) S.R. & O. 1924, No. 385 
(U.K.).
74 See Geva v. Walt Disney Co., P.L.A. 2687/92, P.D. (1) 251. This is not far from the six criteria 
used by the Canadian Supreme Court. See supra note 72.
75 Id. and see Joshua Weisman, Israel, in INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT LAW AND PRACTICE, at 
ISR-38-39 (M. Nimmer & P. Geller eds., 1991)
76
 Copyright Act, supra note 64 §§ 3C and 3D.  A right to remuneration is provided.
77 Id. § 2(1)(VI).
78 Id. § 2(1)(IV).
79 See Weisman, supra note 66 at ISR-41.
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requirement of fairness. The types of free uses allowed are usually very well defined and 
limited in scope.  A few national examples may be useful to illustrate the scope of these 
exceptions. 
In France, the rights of authors are almost sacred. Therefore, exceptions to 
copyright are interpreted narrowly and users clearly have no rights following from those 
exceptions under copyright law.80  Exceptions are mostly for private use.81  In one case, 
and then only in a obiter, a French court said it would be prepared to consider a defense 
to infringement based on the “public’s right to information,” which is recognized under 
Article 10.1 of the European Convention on Human Rights.82  There is a also a 
recognition, in France and in Germany,83 that authors must be granted a certain freedom 
to reuse works of other authors and that such “freedom” is normatively at a higher level 
than the right of a simple user, in particular a commercial user.84
The main exception under Dutch copyright law is for private use.85  It applies to 
both reproduction and performance.  The private copying exception applies to companies 
in the area of press and journal reviews.  There is an exception for quotations86, use by 
government87 and for public education88.   Universities believed they could freely 
produce “anthologies” (coursepacks) for students but after losing a court battle in 1986 
made an agreement with the Dutch publishers and reprography collective.89 There are 
also interesting exceptions specific to the field of fine arts. Section 19 allows “the 
80 See ANDRÉ LUCAS & H.- J. LUCAS, TRAITÉ DE LA PROPRIÉTÉ LITTÉRAIRE ET ARTISTIQUE, (2nd
ed., 2001), at 251-254.
81
 Code de la propriété intellectuelle, § L.122-5.
82
 TGI Paris, 3rd ch., 23 Feb. 1999, D. 1999 580.
83 See the Alcolix and Asterix Persiflagen cases, both by the Federal Court (BGH ), at [1994] 
GRUR 191 and 206, also available in English at [1994] IIC 605 and 610; and the “Germania 3” 
case, [2001] GRUR 149.
84
 In French, known as the “exploitant” ( “exploiter”) of the work—an indication of the mindset. 
See ALAIN STROWEL, DROIT D’AUTEUR ET COPYRIGHT 268 (1993).
85 See Herman Cohen Jehoram, in INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 
66 at NETH-62,3; and § 16 of the Copyright Act, 1912 (as last amended by the Law of October 
27, 1972). 
86
 Copyright Act, supra note 76 at § 15a.
87 Id § 15b.
88 Id. § 16.
25
reproduction of a portrait by or on behalf of the person portrayed,” while Section 24 
allows “unless otherwise agreed, the author of a painting [to] make further similar 
paintings,” notwithstanding the transfer of his copyright.  
In the Nordic countries, there are exceptions for private reproduction coupled with 
a remuneration system (levy), as in s. 12(1) of the Swedish Copyright Act90.  Exceptions 
are also provided for quotations91 and use by libraries and archives92.  The remuneration 
system for private copying is highly developed in most Nordic countries.  For example 
Norwegian schools and universities paid €39.06 per university student and €34.13 per 
college students in 2002-2003 just for photocopies.93
3. Considerations Concerning Private Use
A fourth and final “category’, which in reality is a subset of the second and third, 
deals with private use.  But the rationale is different. Legislators tend to see private use as 
uncontrollable, technically but also from a policy standpoint.94 In other words, they are 
not excluded because of a public interest imperative but almost as a practical matter 
following from the unenforceability of the right. Whether often accompanied by a 
remuneration on blank media, recording equipment or both, certain private uses, usually 
limited to reproduction and performance for family and friends, is allowed.  Clearly, 
these exceptions have end-users in mind, because they use works in ways that, at least 
pre-Internet, did not interfere with “normal commercial exploitation” and were, in fact, 
uncontrollable.
89 See Informatierecht/AMI 1986/5, 119-121.
90
 An Act on Copyright in Literary and Artistic Works, Law No. 729, of December 30, 1960, as 
last amended by Law No. 1274, of December 7, 1995. 
91 Id. § 22.
92 Id. § 16.
93
 KOPINOR News, No. 2 vol. 6, Summer 2002. See www.kopinor.no. As of October 31, 2003, 
the U.S. equivalents are $45.50 and $39.75 respectively. 
94
 In the sense that enforcement of copyright vis-à-vis individual users was not foreseen. The 
RIAA (civil) and Australian (criminal) lawsuits may force us to question the assumption.
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The recent adoption by the European Parliament of a Directive concerning the 
enforcement of intellectual property rights is not consonant with this approach and allows 
stringent enforcement measures, such as search and seizure of equipment and other 
provisional measures against not only professional pirates but also, it seems, individual
end-users95, and a right to order the disclosure of the origin of infringing material96.  In 
the case of infringements on a commercial scale, additional measures, such as seizure of 
bank accounts, is also provided97.
A final type of exception, if that is what it is, is the exhaustion of rights, also 
known as the first-sale doctrine98. Conceptually, it is very close to the private use 
exceptions and is congruent with the idea that end-users should be free to use lawfully-
acquired copies as they wish, but could also be said to reflect a balance between the 
chattel rights of the user and the intellectual property rights of the copyright owner.  This 
was the approach chosen by the Supreme Court of Canada in a recent decision99.  Binnie 
J., writing the majority opinion, stated:
“The proper balance among these and other public policy objectives lies not 
only in recognizing the creator's rights but in giving due weight to their limited 
nature. In crassly economic terms it would be as inefficient to overcompensate 
artists and authors for the right of reproduction as it would be self-defeating to 
under-compensate them. Once an authorized copy of a work is sold to a member 
of the public, it is generally for the purchaser, not the author, to determine what 
happens to it.
95 See Art. 8 of the “Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on 
measures and procedures to ensure the enforcement of intellectual property rights - Text agreed 
by the Permanent Representatives Committee following its meetings on 11 and 13 February 2004 
with a view to reaching agreement with the European Parliament at first reading”, EU Council 
document 6376/04 of 16 February 2004 (8 March 2004). Available at 
<http://europa.eu.int/comm/internal_market/en/indprop/piracy/>.
96 Idem, Art. 9.
97 Idem, Art. 10.
98 See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
99
 Théberge v. Galeries d’art du Petit-Champlain, Inc., [2002] SCC 34. The decision was 
“confirmed” in a unanimous decision by the same Court in March 2004. See supra note 71. 
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This case demonstrates the basic economic conflict between the holder of the 
intellectual property in a work and the owner of the tangible property that 
embodies the copyrighted expressions.100” (emphasis added)
E. Application of copyright exceptions to the Internet
Analogue-era exceptions to copyright do not apply easily to the Internet environment.101
Let us start with private use. In several countries, blank tape levies are now imposed on 
blank digital media.  In Greece, the levy was applicable to personal computers (PCs)102
and the same could be true of Germany, according to proposals made by VG WORT103, 
the reprography collective in that country. In Canada, private copying now applies to 
CDR, CD audio and, as of February 2004, also to certain types of removable memory 
devices.  The levy on Apple’s iPod and similar devices is now $CAN25 (approximately 
US$19) per unit.104
Can a levy on a PC achieve the same “rough justice” purpose105 as a levy on a 
blank audio cassette? There was minimal cross-subsidization in the case of cassettes (few 
people recorded sounds other than protected music, or their own music), and in aggregate 
the measure could be said to be fair because most of the material recorded was 
100 Id. ¶¶ 31-33.
101 See PETERS, supra note 27 and accompanying text.
102
 But was retroactively cancelled. See HUGENHOLTZ, supra note 20 at 30 § 4.2.7.
103 The full name of the organization is Verwertungsgesellschaft Wort: http://www.vgwort.de. See 
Press Release, German Patent Office, Schiedsstelle nach dem Urheberrechtswahrnehmungsgesetz 
entscheidet über urheberrechtliche Vergütungspflicht für PCs, (Feb. 6, 2003) at
http://www.dpma.de/infos/pressedienst/pm030206.html. See also HUGENHOLTZ, supra note 20, at 
26 § 4.2.3
104 See Tariff of Levies to Be Collected by CPCC in 2003 and 2004 on the Sale of Blank Audio 
Recording Media, in Canada, in Respect of the Reproduction for Private Use of Musical Works 
Embodied in Sound Recordings, of Performer’s Performances of Such Works and of Sound 
Recordings in Which such Works and Performances Are Embodied, Decision of the Copyright 
Board of Canada, Dec. 12, 2003, at 20. Available at <http://www.cb-
cda.gc.ca/decisions/c12122003-b.pdf> (last accessed Feb. 24, 2004).
105 See, e.g., Michael Hart, The Copyright in the Information Society Directive: An Overview, 24 
Eur. Intell. Prop. Rev. 58, 60 (2002). See also Conference, Franklin Pierce Law Center’s Seventh 
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presumably recorded music.  Perhaps the same is true of MP3-specific recording 
apparatus, but is the same true of CD-Rs? When it comes to PCs, however, clearly 
copying recorded music, except for a minority of users, will not be the main activity.  
Cross-subsidization thus becomes the rule rather than the exception. 
More fundamentally, is it more desirable, from a policy standpoint, to regulate 
private use in a digital environment than it was in the analogue one? The answer is multi-
faceted. Technical protection measures are now routinely used to limit the type of private 
use that one can make with some forms of protected content. The policy justification is 
that private use is in fact no longer private because end-users become intermediaries by 
re-disseminating the content (such as in peer-to-peer situations).  In addition, current 
copyright rights focus on various uses of protected material, not their effects.  In that 
respect, the DMCA106 probably introduced an entirely different layer of rights, an access 
right, which is not linked to the protection of the use of the content and is independent of 
whether the use benefits from a license or exception107. Measures to scan hard disks and 
sundry spyware pushed on individual users were the subject of debate in Congress.108
Yet, until the DMCA and in the entire history of copyright, measures destined to control 
end-users were by far the exception and not the rule.109
Biennial Intellectual Property System Major Problems Conference - Digital Technology and 
Copyright: A Threat or a Promise?, 39 IDEA 291 (1999).
106
 DMCA, supra note 37.
107
 The preservation of fair use was given very little regard in Universal City Studios, Inc. v. 
Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 458-459 (U.S. App. , 2001), aff’g Universal City Studios, Inc. v. 
Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d 346 (S.D.N.Y. 2000): “We know of no authority for the proposition 
that fair use, as protected by the Copyright Act, much less the Constitution, guarantees copying 
by the optimum method or in the identical format of the original. Although the Appellants 
insisted at oral argument that they should not be relegated to a "horse and buggy" technique in 
making fair use of DVD movies, the DMCA does not impose even an arguable limitation on the 
opportunity to make a variety of traditional fair uses of DVD movies, such as commenting on 
their content, quoting excerpts from their screenplays, and even recording portions of the video 
images and sounds on film or tape by pointing a camera, a camcorder, or a microphone at a 
monitor as it displays the DVD movie. The fact that the resulting copy will not be as perfect or as 
manipulable as a digital copy obtained by having direct access to the DVD movie in its digital 
form, provides no basis for a claim of unconstitutional limitation of fair use.”
108
 For example, the controversial H.R. 5211, 107th Cong. 2d Sess. (2002) from Rep. Howard 
Berman (D-CA).
109 See supra  note 17 and accompanying text.
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Another huge shift in the application of copyright exceptions is of course that 
online access has replaced distribution (of copies) with licensing. Hence the first-sale 
doctrine, perhaps one the most important “exceptions” to copyright, is fast disappearing.  
This applies to professional users, such as in inter-library loans situations, but also to 
individuals who can no longer pass on content that they no longer wish to use to other 
users 
IV. The Way Forward
A. The Reverse Three-step test
Fair use is one of the keys to understand the way forward I am proposing. I am not 
suggesting that US-style fair use be introduced in all countries.  Clearly, however, fair 
use is a much more flexible and adaptable doctrine with respect to new forms of use than 
purpose-specific exception110, most of which are not technologically-neutral.111  This 
explains why its introduction is being considered in a number of countries currently using 
the more restrictive fair dealing exceptions112.  If one can agree with the premise that fair 
use reflects an appropriate set of criteria to balance the rights of copyright holders and the 
needs and interests of users, I suggest it could serve as a basis to build the copyright of 
the future.113 To do this, we must internationalize the test, by combining it with the 
Berne three-step test. 114
110 See supra notes 13and 72.
111
 Although it has to be said that technological neutrality is not always desirable. Applied to a 
regulation, it means that the regulation will apply to new technologies, the invention or 
development of which cannot be foreseen.  The pre-regulation of those technologies may produce 
undesirable consequences and even prevent the deployment of new technologies.  See also, Ruth 
Okediji, Toward An International Fair Use Doctrine, 39 Colum. J. Transnat'l L. 75 (2000) and 
GERVAIS, supra note 35, at 120.
112
 For example, Canada. See SUPPORTING CULTURE AND INNOVATION: REPORT ON THE 
PROVISIONS AND OPERATION OF THE COPYRIGHT ACT, at 33-37 § B2, available at
http://strategis.ic.gc.ca/pics/rp/section92eng.pdf (October 2002).
113 See Okediji, supra note 95, at 168-169. 
114 See supra III.B. 
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Fair use is an exception to copyright115 or more precisely a test to determine 
whether a use of copyrighted content not authorized by the rightsholder constitutes an 
infringement of the copyright.  In the same way, the three-step test is the accepted 
international standard to determine whether an exception to copyright in national 
legislation is TRIPS-compliant.116
What I suggest is reversing the test, based on the assumption that what the 
exception (whether fair use in domestic US law or the three-step test at the multilateral 
level) does not allow is what in fact copyright intended to protect.  Expressed in 
mathematical terms, if fair use is the “A” universe, then the “non-A” universe contains 
uses that require a license. The reversal, as we will see, is both appropriate and powerful. 
It is appropriate because it focuses on the effect of the use on rightsholders. The right 
(which can be viewed as the “non-exempt” universe) is also effects-based, thus 
addressing much of the criticism examined above.117 It is powerful because it both solves 
the issues related to the nature-based bundle now used in most national laws118 and is by 
definition TRIPS-compliant.  If uses not allowed by the three-step test are protected (i.e., 
only uses allowed under the three-step test are exempted), there can be no violation of 
Berne. Other solutions requiring an amendment to TRIPS do not have the same appeal, 
simply because amending the Agreement seems far from simple politically.119
115
 For the purposes of this analysis, we do not need to enter into the debate as to whether fair use 
is a right, whether one can derogate to fair use by contract, etc.  For more on these debates See
LUCIE M.C.R. GUIBAULT, COPYRIGHT LIMITATIONS AND CONTRACTS: AN ANALYSIS OF THE 
CONTRACTUAL OVERRIDABILITY OF LIMITATIONS ON COPYRIGHT (2002); and L. RAY 
PATTERSON & STANLEY W. LINDBERG, THE NATURE OF COPYRIGHT: A LAW OF USERS’ RIGHTS
(1991), at 191-222.
116 See supra section III.B
117 See GUIBAULT, supra note 98, at § Definition of the Problem.
118
 Though not all. See infra note 110 and accompanying text.
119
 Recent debates in the context of the Doha Round have shown that any modification of the 
TRIPS Agreement will be extremely difficult to achieve. One reason is that once the Agreement 
is reopened, all of its contents may become fair game.  An attempt to update the copyright section 
(Articles 9-14) may thus prompt demands by others to reopen the patent or enforcement sections. 
As of March 2004, there were ongoing consultations on how to convert the 30 August 2003 
Decision on paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration (on access to generic medicines) into an 
amendment of the TRIPS Agreement.. See GERVAIS, supra note 35, at 43-51. 
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How does one reverse the test?  Starting from a domestic US viewpoint, the 
question would be simply as follows: If fair use is fair, then what use is unfair use? I 
submit that “unfair” (i.e., protected) use would be use that does not meet the two real 
steps of the Berne three-step test, that is, use that interferes with normal commercial 
exploitation or unreasonably (unjustifiably) prejudices the copyright holder’s rights.  Any 
use that demonstrably and substantially reduces financial benefits that the copyright 
owner can reasonably expect to receive under normal commercial circumstances would 
be “unfair” without authorization.  
How one measures unfairness and interference with normal commercial 
exploitation in this context is fundamental.  I suggest that the question should not be not 
whether a user got “value” without paying but whether the user should have obtained the 
content through a normal commercial transaction120.  Three observations are in order: 
First, this clearly applies only to published content121.  Second, it is not because a work is 
unavailable in a given form that taking is ipso facto fair because no normal commercial 
transaction is possible.  Rightsholders must be given a certain degree of flexibility in how 
they make works available on various markets and in various formats.  It also means, 
however, that market practices are relevant: Is the type of use or user one that would 
normally be licensed (on a transactional or collective basis)?  Is the kind of material 
normally (only) available on a commercial basis? Finally, it is essential to view normalcy 
(of commercial exploitation) as a dynamic notion that is influenced by technological 
development and consumer behavior.  It is clear, in my view, that the Internet may have
changed what “normal commercial exploitation” means. Unlicensed access for private 
use to material available on the Internet should in most cases be considered normal122. 
120 See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
121 A right of first publication exists in most national laws.  In the US, fair use of unpublished material has 
been limited by a number of court decisions. See Kate O'Neill, Against Dicta: A Legal Method for 
Rescuing Fair Use From the Right of First Publication, 89 Cal. L. Rev. 369 (2001). 
122
 This is not unprecedented.  There are many areas of law, from antitrust to contract formation, 
where courts routinely consider relevant market practices. See David McGowan, “Recognizing 
Usages of Trade: A Case Study From Electronic Commerce,” 8 Wash. U. J.L. & Pol'y 167
(2002).
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The second step of the Berne test, namely the unreasonable prejudice to legitimate 
interests of the rightsholder, is one of public interest v. author’s rights.123  The relevant 
rights must be those protected under the Copyright Act. This is where the reasoning 
blends the two steps (without, one hopes, becoming circular). The author has a right in 
respect of any commercially significant use (use that would normally be the subject of a 
commercial transaction).  Any situation not covered by this right would be one that is not 
subject to normal commercial exploitation and is justified by a valid public interest 
purpose. 
B. Comparison with Other Proposals
There have been various suggestions to create a “use right,” because the current 
fragmented lists of copyright rights do not mesh with the reality of cyberspace.  Prof. 
Litman suggested such a right in her Digital Copyright book124.  Stanford law professor 
Lawrence Lessig points in that direction, notably in The Future of Ideas, first when he 
discusses the VCR example and the potential for substantial non-infringing uses125 and 
then when he writes, 
In responding to the shock that the Internet presents to copyright law, it is of 
course important to account for the increased exposure to theft.  But the law 
must also draw a balance to assure that this proper response to an increased risk 
of theft does not simultaneously erase the important range of access and use 
rights traditionally protected under copyright law.
123
 One is reminded of the Garner v. Teamsters case (74 S.Ct. 161, 171 (1953)), in which the 
Supreme Court wrote: “We conclude that when federal power constitutionally is exerted for the 
protection of public or private interests, or both, it becomes the supreme law of the land and 
cannot be curtailed, circumvented or extended by a state procedure merely because it will apply 
some doctrine of private right. To the extent that the private right may conflict with the public 
one, the former is superseded” (emphasis added).
124 JESSICA LITMAN, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT: PROTECTING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ON THE 
INTERNET (2001).
125 LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS : THE FATE OF THE COMMONS IN A CONNECTED 
WORLD (2002), at 195-196.
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Professor Andrew Christie has also suggested a use-based copyright right126.  Prof. 
Christie proposes that patrimonial rights be grouped in two categories: reproduction and 
dissemination.127  Professor Ricketson criticized this type of simplification, however.128
There is also a proposal to create a specific right to “Internet transmission,”129 which 
might resolve certain problems specific to the Internet. 
The approach suggested by Professor Jessica Litman is a priori the most 
interesting, but as Professor Ginsburg rightly emphasizes,130 the conceptualization must 
be pushed much farther. In my opinion, one should also take into account international 
treaties, particularly the TRIPS Agreement131.
Other examples of attempts at simplification can be found in certain national laws. 
These attempts are incomplete, and none moves all the way toward an effects-based 
paradigm. This being said, the efforts deserve to be underlined.  One of the best examples 
is the Swiss Copyright Act,132 which provides, in Article 10, “The author has the exclusive 
right to decide when and how his work will be used.” 
China also has a fairly broad notion of copyright, approaching a use right. The 
relevant provisions of the Copyright Law133 read as follows:
“Article 55 Exclusive Rights
(1) Unless otherwise provided, the author shall have the exclusive right to use his 
work, in whole or in part, including notably the right to disclose, publish and 
126 See, e.g., Andrew Christie, A Proposal for Simplifying UK Copyright Law, 23 Eur. Intell. 
Prop. Rev. 26 (2001). 
127 Id. at 37–38. 
128 See Sam Ricketson, Simplifying Copyright Law: Proposals from Down Under, 21 Eur. Intell. 
Prop. Rev. 537 (1999).
129 See M. Lemley, Dealing With Overlapping Copyrights on the Internet, 22 U. Dayton L. R. 
547, 582-583 (2002).
130 J. Ginsburg, Can Copyright Become User-Friendly? Essay Review of Jessica Litman, Digital 
Copyright (Prometheus Books 2001), 25 Columbia-VLA J. of L. & Arts 71, 83 (2002).
131 See supra note 119 and accompanying text.
132 Loi fédérale sur le droit d’auteur et les droits voisins, 9 Oct. 1992.
133
 Decree-Law (Consolidation), of August 16, 1999, No. 43/99/M (WIPO translation).
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economically exploit it in any form, either directly or indirectly, within the limits 
of the law; 
(2)The guarantee of the pecuniary benefits deriving from exploitation of the work 
shall constitute the basic objective, in economic terms, of legal protection134.” 
(emphasis added)
The Canadian government recently opened the door to a broad reflection on this 
subject by putting on the agenda a review of the question of “clarification and 
simplification of the law.”135
These proposals are interesting and many reflect or incorporate solutions to the 
problem of copyright laws and treaties: a fragmented bundle of rights focusing on the 
nature of the use rather than its effects.  
What I am suggesting is that to go a step further and use the recognized 
international test now applicable to all copyright exceptions as the basis to determine the 
appropriate scope of copyright and, by way of consequence, the appropriate exceptions.   
That scope should extend to the control of only commercially significant forms of normal 
exploitation, the normalcy of exploitation being measured dynamically in light of 
changing technological possibilities and societal norms.   
Two additional remarks are in order. My reasoning only applies to the so-called 
economic rights136.  Moral rights (of authorship and integrity) protected by the Berne 
Convention should be analyzed separately.  Exceptions to such moral rights cannot be 
based on commercial exploitation, but on a combined test of public interest137 and 
practicality. 
134 Id.
135 SUPPORTING CULTURE AND INNOVATION: REPORT ON THE PROVISIONS AND OPERATION OF 
THE COPYRIGHT ACT, supra note 96, at 51.
136 See supra note 34.
137
 As to the public interest defense generally, it is available in Australia (Australia v. John 
Fairfax & Sons Ltd., 55 A.L.J.R. 45 (1981)—in respect of at least government documents) and 
the UK.  There are however, UK precedents that limit the application of copyright protection on 
grounds of public interest.  In Ashdown v. Telegraph Group, Ltd ([2002] R.P.C. 5 (C.A.)), the 
Court ruled that freedom of expression was a valid defense to copyright infringement.  It is worth 
quoting at some length the decision of the court (¶¶ 30-34):
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Second, the approach I am suggesting has the advantage of being compatible with 
existing international treaties. Trying to renegotiate the main copyright treaties would not 
be easy and by the time we are done, digital may have been replaced by “trigital” 
technology or whatever comes next, and a host of new challenges for copyright, or should 
I say “useright” lawyers. 
C. Further Considerations on an Effects-Based Test
As mentioned above138, one of the weaknesses of copyright law is that it focuses on the 
nature of the use.  As a result, whether one uses a work for private use, to make 
commercial use or to make a transformative use is of no concern as far as the rights are 
concerned: what matters is that technically a reproduction has taken place.  To 
circumvent this structural difficulty, exceptions (e.g., for private use139, parody140 etc.) 
were added to the mix.  
Using an effects-based test would allow courts to draw appropriate distinctions.  
In almost all cases, non-transformative commercial reuse will infringe the second or third 
part of the three-step test, or both, due to the effect on the market of the rightsholder(s) 
and the absence of an overriding public interest.  A private use normally will not have an 
effect and it may be considered desirable to allow private use, both because the cost (in 
30 […] …copyright is essentially not a positive but a negative right. No provision of the 
Copyright Act confers in terms, upon the owner of a copyright in a literary work, the right to 
publish it. The Act gives the owner of the copyright the right to prevent others from doing that 
which the Act recognises the owner alone has a right to do. Thus copyright is antithetical to 
freedom of expression. It prevents all, save the owner of the copyright, from expressing 
information in the form of the literary work protected by the copyright.
34 […] the defense to a claim for breach of copyright that can be mounted on the basis of "public 
interest.’ This is not a statutory defence, but one which arises at common law,[…]”
138 See supra note 33 and accompanying text. 
139 See supra III.D.3.
140 See infra note 143.
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terms, e.g., of privacy invasion141) and the public interest considerations of favoring 
broad access to information and culture. It will thus pass the test.  In that case, 
implementing an effects-based test simply avoids they current labyrinthine process of 
determining that there was a reproduction or other use (i.e., the nature-based test) and 
then looking for an exception.
But the most striking impact would be in the area of transformative reuse.  There 
is a public interest in allowing creators to reuse existing material, something recognized 
in many legal systems142, including the United States where the Supreme Court arguably 
stretched the notion of parody well beyond its ordinary meaning to accommodate this 
objective.143
By introducing an effects-based test, reuse of material would be allowed not just 
in parody cases, but in all cases where a genuine public interest is served by allowing a 
new creation to emerge without demonstrably affecting (negatively) the market for the 
preexisting work.
Conclusion
This paper first showed that, while exceptions to copyright have historically focused on 
the effects of a particular use of protected works, the rights to which these exceptions 
141 See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
142
 For a civil law example, see supra note 84. 
143
 See Elizabeth Troup Timkovich, The New Significance of the Four Fair Use Factors As 
Applied to Parody: Interpreting The Court’s Analysis in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 5 
Tul. J. Tech. & Intell. Prop. 61, 75 (2003) (“the Supreme Court's actions in Campbell in a way 
that aligns with the public benefit goals of copyright. The Court's fair use analysis in the context 
of parody can be explained as shifting the primary fair use emphasis away from the fourth fair use 
factor (market harm), where it was placed by the Nation Court in 1985 in the context of news 
reporting, to the first fair use factor (purpose of the work). It is plausible that the Court made this 
shift knowingly, so as to advance the public policy of copyright, to foster the creation of new 
works available to the public. The analysis involved in the Court's evaluation of the first fair use 
factor is the most in tune with this public policy question, as it entails determining whether the 
disputed parody has transformed the original copyrighted work into something new. The fourth 
fair use factor has far less significance in this analysis, as, ideally, a transformative parody should 
not supplant market demand for the copyrighted work upon which it is based.”)
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apply are based on the nature of the use. This has at least two undesirable consequences. 
First, it forces copyright holders to organize the legal structure of protection against 
technical forms of use where in fact their real concern is with the market and the effects 
that a particular use may have in reducing or enhancing future market options. Second, 
there is a logical discrepancy between the right and the exception which renders 
exceptions difficult to apply and their borders very difficult to circumscribe. 
In the search for a solution to enhance the current situation, we suggested that an 
effects-based norm (a new copyright right) would better respond to problems that 
copyright holders currently face, in particular on the Internet, while enhancing legal 
security for users by increasing the correlation between the right and the exception.  
Because the three-step test found in Article 9(2) of the Berne Convention is now 
the foundation for all exceptions to intellectual property rights in treaties concluded since 
1994, including the TRIPS Agreement, we first studied this fundamental test and its 
application in key national and regional laws to determine what uses would be allowed 
under it. We then suggested reversing the test, as it were, to determine the scope of 
disallowed uses, ie those to which the exclusive right of the copyright owner should 
apply. The proposal, in effect, is that rights be defined to mirror permissible exceptions 
under Berne Article 9(2) and Article 13 of TRIPS. In doing so, international copyright 
treaties would no longer constitute set of minimum standards with a cap on permissible 
exceptions but rather coherent normative approach to regulating commercially significant 
uses of material, including on the Internet. 
We then analyzed this proposal against extant proposals to improve or simplify 
international copyright norms.  The last section of the article demonstrates that the use of 
an effects-based test would both simplify the determination of infringements and allow 
greater transformative reuse of protected material.
